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A NECESSARY matter of inquiry in any civil fraud case, arising
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, is whether the tax-
payer has harboured a fraudulent intent to evade and defeat a tax
which he knows and believes to be due and owing.' In a recent
decision, Emanuel Hollman,2 the Tax Court has held there to be
no such fraudulent intent where the taxpayer raised the defense of
insanity. That recent decision, by reason of its possible significant
implications, prompts consideration of the relationship of the condi-
tion of insanity or incompetency of the taxpayer to matters of federal
taxation in general and to the civil fraud penalty in particular.
The purpose of this article is to discuss some aspects of the defense
of insanity to the assertion of the civil fraud penalty, in a case
docketed in the Tax Court of the United States.
II
SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
A. The Fraud Case in the Tax Court
After administrative investigation and consideration of the po-
tential fraud case where no agreement with respect to imposition or
removal of the civil fraud penalty is reached by the Internal Revenue
Service and the taxpayer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
through his delegate, may issue a statutory notice of deficiency to the
taxpayer.3 In this notice of deficiency, the Commissioner may de-
* The views expressed are the author's and should not be considered as being the
opinion of the Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue Service, or the Chief
Counsel's Office.
f A.B. 1958, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1958, George Washington University;
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Atlanta Region, Internal Revenue Service.
"William W. Kellett, 5 T.C. 608 (1945); M. Rea Gano, 19 B.T.A. 518 (1930);
10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 55.10.
*38 T.C. No. 28 (1962), on rehearing, P-H 1962 Tax Ct. Memo V 62,236 (1962).
* INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6212.
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termine that there is due from the taxpayer a deficiency in tax,
together with a fifty per cent addition to the tax for fraud.4 With-
in ninety days from the issuance of the statutory notice of de-
ficiency, the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court of the United
States for redetermination of the proposed deficiency in tax, and for
redetermination of the proposed addition to the tax for fraud.5
The statutory authority relied upon by the Commissioner for
assertion of the addition to the tax for fraud is section 6653 (b) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Under that provision, the
severe sanction of the addition to the tax of fifty per cent of any
underpayment is imposed upon the taxpayer where "any part of the
underpayment... of tax required to be shown on a return is due to
fraud ... ." This civil sanction is obviously quite severe. Its im-
portance is magnified by consideration of the rule that the fraud
penalty may be imposed where the underpayment is due, in whole
or in part, to fraud. Thus, where fraud exists, the penalty attaches
not merely to the fraudulent item but to the entire underpayment. 6
The basic purpose of the civil fraud penalty is remedial-to protect
the revenue and to compensate the Government for the 'expense
of investigation and prosecution of the fraud case
In the docketed tax court case where the determination of fraud is
at issue, the burden of proof with respect to fraud is placed upon
the Commissioner by statute and by the rules of practice of the Tax
Court.8 The standard of proof required of the Commissioner is
that the taxpayer's fraud must be proven to the satisfaction of the
court by "clear and convincing evidence." The litigated cases
which are legion, demonstrate that this is a burden not be lightly
regarded.'0 A leading authority on the subject of fraud, both
criminal and civil, has succinctly described this formidable 'task as
follows:
It is an illusion that there is any clear demarcation between a set of facts
which would justify only the imposition of the 50% civil fraud penalty,
and one which would call for tax evasion prosecution. Statutorily, the
requirement for the civil penalty is simply 'fraud,' while for criminal tax
'See, e.g., Kiker v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1955).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213.
Arlette Coat Co., 14 T.C. 751 (1950); Maitland A. Wilson, 7 T.C. 395 (1946).
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7454 (a); TAX COURT R. PRc. 32.
'Estate of Helene Simmons, 26 T.C. 409, 426 (1956).10 See 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATiON § 55.09.
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evasion, it is 'wilfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax.'
As a matter of actual experience, it can be safely stated that given identi-
cal sets of facts, it would often be more difficult for the Commissioner
successfully to sustain an asserted civil fraud penalty in the Tax Court
than it would be for the United States Attorney to obtain a conviction in
a criminal evasion case before a jury."
In relating the defense of insanity to the assertion of such fraud
penalty, it would be convenient to provide a capsule definition of
fraud, but such a definition would be illusory. The potential sources
of fraud in tax cases are virtually without limit; the ingenuity of
the taxpayers compounded by the complexity of the statutes involved
insure this. Not only are the matters of "fraud" without limit and
not susceptible to precise legal definition, but to attempt to be too
specific would open the door to calculated evasion by quibbling over
the terms used and their precise legal import.' 2 However, it is clear
that one of the elements of fraud which must be shown by the Com-
missioner to sustain his determination in court is the taxpayer's
fraudulent intent.
B. Intent, an Element of Fraud
There is one essential element which is the very heart of the
fraud issue, namely, "the intent to defraud the Government by cal-
culated tax evasion."' 3  It is in considering this element of fraud,
which is the actual "intent to evade," that the plea of insanity or in-
competency becomes relevant. From a definitional standpoint,
what is the nature of the requisite "intent to evade?" In any matter
so essentially factual as the matter of fraud, any attempt at precise
definition will provoke dissent. However, one favored statement
of the nature of the intent required is as follows:
The term fraud means actual intentional wrongdoing, and the intent
required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be owing.
Fraud implies bad faith, intentional wrongdoing and a sinister motive.
It is never imputed or presumed .... Generally speaking, there must be
an intent to mislead or defraud before the penalty can be imposed. The
first and basic element in fraud is a fraudulent intent-a state of mind
11 See Baiter, A Ten Year Review of Fraud Prosecutions, NYU 19Tu INST. oN FED.
TAX 1125, 1135 (1961).
1210 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATON § 55.10.
Is E. S. Iley, 19 T.C. 631, 635 (1952).
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which, if translated into action is calculated to cheat or deceive the
Government. The state of mind may be express or implicit in action, but
its existence must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The
intent required is a specific intent .... 1-
Perhaps the immediate reaction is that presence of the condition
of insanity would automatically preclude assertion of the civil fraud
penalty during the administrative stages of the case, for how could
such fraudulent intent, as defined above, be harbored by a clearly
insane person? Or stated another way, how could the defense of
insanity ever be seriously raised in a case where the taxpayer has
entered financial transactions of such complexity to lead to realiza-
tion of income of such magnitude as to justify assertion of the fraud
penalty? There is probably an initial reaction that such a defense
could not be seriously advanced in any case of sufficient merit to
survive the intensive administrative and pretrial review given any
case where the civil fraud penalty has been asserted.15 The obvious
case of insanity would clearly be so eliminated. However, there are
many types of insanity, many borderline cases, and many grades of
insanity.16 Moreover, in view of the widely expanding medico-
legal concept of insanity, it is patent that such broad conclusion is
erroneous.7 The paucity of decided cases in which this issue has
been presented affords some support for the view that the defense is,
rarely litigated. However, the recent decision of the Tax Court in
Emanuel Hollman, discussed in detail below, clearly reveals that
such initial reaction, while logical, is not necessarily correct. That
recent Tax Court decision prompts some consideration of the
various types of insanity, legal capacity to act, and the relationship
of insanity to matters of federal taxation.
III
INSANITY AS IT RELATES TO THE INTENT TO Avow TAXATION
A. Forms of Insanity and. Civil Incapacity
There are many forms of medical insanity or incompetency, of
varying degrees of severity,' 8 and other conditions which may affect
"' 10 MERTENS, LAW Or FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 55.10. See also William W.
Kellett, 5 T.C. 608 (1945); M. Rea Gano, 19 B.T.A. 518 (1930).
2
5 5ee Internal Revenue Service: Organization and Functions, §§ 1113.73, 1114.9,
1116.2, 1118.6, 21 Fed. Reg. 10418 (1956); 10 MERTENS, LAW or FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION § 55.15.
18 See notes 17 and 18 infra.
27 See LiNDMAN & MAcINTYaE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1961).
28E.g., Delerium, a state of mind where the mind acts without direction by the
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one's reason which do not constitute recognized insanity or incom-
petency. 9 This conditon of one's mind may affect one's capacity
to do or perform an act recognized as having legal significance.
Legal insanity, which exonerates one from blame for crime or renders
one incapable from civil action, is a mental deficiency with refer-
ence to the particular act in question; it does not necessarily require
a general incapacity. Therefore, there can be no general definition
of legal insanity. It is a condition which must be noted with refer-
ence to each class of actions to which it is applied.20
The general principle, governing the civil incapacity of a person
of unsound mind is that any civil act is invalid or voidable if the
actor was, at the time, laboring under such mental defect as to render
him incapable of performing the act in question rationally and
without detriment to any person affected thereby.21 There is further
power of volition; Delerium tremens, insanity produced by the collapse of the human
system as a result of habitual drunkenness; Delusion, (a) belief in things impossible
according to human experience and (b) belief in things possible, but so improbable
that no person of sound mind would entertain such belief; Emotional insanity, one in
possession of his ordinary faculties, without mental disease, who gives away to his
passions to such an extent as to become a temporary maniac; Feeble-mindedness, in-
complete development of mind of such degree or kind as to render one incapable of
adjusting to his social environment without care, supervision or control; Hallucination,
false perception of objects which do not, in fact, make an impression on the external
senses; Homicidal mania, the morbid and uncontrolled appetite for mankilling;
Hypnotism, induced somnambulism; Idiocy, the condition of one who from birth
has lacked reason; Imbeciliiy, a more general term applied to many conditions and
forms of mental weakness; Irresistible or uncontrollable impulse, impulsive insanity
(not the situation where one in possession of reason is impelled by passion to com-
mission of repulsive acts); Kleptomania, a morbid propensity to steal, whether con-
scious or unconscious; Lunacy, an impairment of one or more mental faculties
accompanied by a defect in the power of comparison; Monomaniac, one insane on a
particular subject but sane on all other matters; Moral insanity, inability to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong; non compos mentis, a person entirely destitute of
memory and understanding; Paranoia, delusional insanity or monomania; Partial
insanity, a clouded or weakened mind, not incapable of memory, reason or judgment;
Schizophrenia, a loss of contact with environment and disintegration of the personality;
Temporary insanity, temporary derangement resulting from a transient condition, such
as introxication. 29 Am. JUR. Insane Persons § 3 (1960).
10 E.g., Deafness, dumbness, blindness, accident, disease, bad judgment, inexperience,
susceptibility, eccentricities, particular beliefs, prejudices, and habitual drunkenness, 29
Am. JUR. Insane Persons §§ 4-8 (1960).
20 1 Bouv. LAW DIcT. 1589 (1914).
21 Thus, e.g., where an ordinary matter of contract is in question, the inquiry would
be to determine whether the defect precluded rational assent to the contract, be it
marriage, partnership or sale; and as to testamentary capacity, whether the defect pre-
cluded the testator from knowing the nature and extent of his property, to be aware
of the natural objects of his bounty, and to appreciate the effect of the disposition made
by him. 1 Bouv. LAw DIcT. 1598 (1914); 29 Am. JuR. Insane Persons § 81 (1960). To
the contrary, it is well settled that an incompetent, at common law, is liable for an
injury caused by his tortious act committed where insane, provided that malice or
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authority, however, which indicates that, where intent is a necessary
element of the civil action in question, mental incapacity to harbour
such requisite intent will absolve the actor from civil liability.
Thus, where malice is an element of libel or slander, or of malicious
prosecution,22 or in a tort suit where exemplary or punitive damages
are at issue,2 most jurisdictions will not impose civil liability upon
an actor of unsound mind.24  Similarly, in the case of an action for
fraud or deceit where intent is an element of the action, the majority
view is that the insane person may not be held for damages in an
action for fraud or deceit based upon intent.2 5
B. The Test Applicable in Matters of Civil Taxation
In matters of federal taxation such as determining the realization
of income or the deductibility of losses or expenditures, knowledge,
intent, insanity or incompetence of the taxpayer should ordinarily
be collateral to the question presented. As succinctly put by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: "Save in those instances
where the statute itself turns on intent, a matter so real as taxation
must depend on objective realities, not on the varying subjective
beliefs of individual taxpayers." 28
Thus, an income tax return for the incompetent must be filed,
and the incompetent and his committee are considered one taxable
entity.27 In the case of the deductibility of interest,2 or in de-
termining the time a loss has been sustained for federal tax pur-
poses,29 application of an objective test provided by the statutes in-
volved has led to rejection by the courts of the subjective views and
state of mind of the taxpayer in reaching their result 3 0 It has long
been the position of the Internal Revenue Service that a dividend
check was income to an incompetent, even though he was legally in-
intent to injure is not a neccessary element of the tort. 29 Am. Jua. Insane Persons
§ 104 (1960).
2A Ar. JiR. Insane Persons §§ 106-07 (1960).
23 Wilson v. Walt, 138 Kan. 205, 25 P.2d 343 (1933); Phillips Committee v. Ward's
Adm'r., 241 Ky. 25, 43 S.W.2d 331 (1931); Beaubeauf v. Reed, 4 La. App. 344 (1926).
2, Parke v. Dennard, 218 Ala. 209, 118 So. 396 (1928); Annot. 51 A.L.R. 833 (1927),
89 A.L.R. 476 (1934).
5 Chaddock v. Chaddock, 130 Misc. 900, 226 N.Y.S. 152 (1927).
2OLynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1959). See also MacRae v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1962)..
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6012 (b) (2); I.T. 3996, 1950-1 Cum. BuL. 130.
28 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163.
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165.
80 Boehm v, Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945); Perry A, Nichols, 37 T.C. 74 (1962).
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capable of endorsing or cashing such dividend check.31 Similarly,
an incompetent's committee would be governed by the ordinary
rules with respect to the exchanges of like property.3 2 It is also
probably highly significant that incompetency does not appear to
have been raised as a defense to taxability of gains even in those
cases where insanity has been raised as a defense to fraud.3 3 How-
ever, an exception to this apparent general rule was presented in
Juliette B. Andrews"4 where the taxpayer, decreed incompetent, was
held to have not realized gain in the year of sale on the unauthorized
and improper sale of her securities by her chauffeur. She was held
to have realized income only upon recovery of the proceeds of sale
by her guardian.
On the other hand, incompetency of the taxpayer involved would
appear to be relevant in determining subjectively, e.g., whether the
taxpayer held the "view" requisite under the collapsible corporation
provisions,3 5 whether he was competent to form the necessary do-
native intent to make a gift,36 whether a transfer was made in con-
templation of death3 7 whether the taxpayer was liable for the addi-
tion to the taxy for failure to file a declaration of estimated tax or
whether such failure to file was due to reasonable cause,38 and other
21 1.T. 2072, 111-2 GUM. BuLm 76 (1924).
£2 Rev. Rul. 57-469, 1957-2 CuM. Bum.. 521.
33 See, e.g., Emanuel Hollman, 38 T.C. No. 28 (1962); United States v. Peelle Co.,
137 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Fred M. Staudt, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1262 (1953),
aff'd per curiam, 216 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1954); Estate of Clinton H. Martin, 28 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 88 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 272 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1959); Pasquale
Colabella, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 608 (1958).
$4 11 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 847 (1942).
2£ INT. R.v. CODE OF 1954, § 341. See Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949
(2d Cir. 1962).
" David L. Zips, 38 T.C. No. 62 (1962). In Zips, George Westinghouse had
transferred cash and securities to Marie Zips without consideration. Subsequent to
the date of such transfers, the transferor had been judicially determined to be of
unsound mind at the time of the transfers and lacking the requisite mental capacity to
effect a valid gift. In view of the transferor's lack of capacity to entertain the required
donative intent, the Tax Court held the transfers to be not excludible from gross
income as a gift under § 102 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, but fully taxable
to the transferee as ordinary income under § 61 (a). This, despite the fact that it had
been judicially determined in litigation between the trustee for the transferor in a
year subsequent to the transfer, that the transfers were not gifts between the parties
and that the transferee did not acquire title thereto.
7 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
38Estate of Gladys Forbes, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 182 (1953). In that case, the
Commissioner conceded that there was no fraud. From the opinion, however, it is
not apparent whether the concession was based upon the taxpayer's mental condition.
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analogous situations where the taxpayer's subjective processes were
relevant.
In the foregoing situations, it would appear that insanity or
incompetence of the taxpayer is generally collateral to the question
presented, unless such mental condition directly affects the legal
condition to taxability or deductibility.
C. Insanity and the Decided Cases Prior
to the Emanuel Hollman Case
Fraud cases, which involve the element of intent, are another
matter. It is patent that if fraudulent intent is a state of mind as
the opinions indicate, insanity is relevant. In such cases, the real
questions are: What is the test of insanity in determining whether
the taxpayer has the capacity to form the requisite fraudulent intent,
and, to what act does this test relate. That is to say, is it merely
a question of general mental incapacity and lack of ability to formu-
late a fraudulent intent, or must the proof go further-must it show
that the mental incapacity relates specifically to the federal income
tax return.
Prior to the decision in Emanuel Hollman, the relatively few
cases presented to the courts do not appear to have submitted for
decision on good records, the issue of insanity. In those cases, evi-
dence was presented to the effect that the taxpayer was under
observation for his mental condition in a sanitarium during the
taxable year involved;3 9 that the taxpayer had suffered from mental
disturbances, had undergone electric shock treatments for such condi-
tion, and had generally suffered some loss of memory or mental
retrogression during the period at issue; 0 or that the taxpayer had
arteriosclerosis and resultant bad judgment, upon which condition
he had attempted to place blame for omission of income.41 Each
contention that the taxpayer's mental condition would preclude a
finding of fraud was rejected by the Tax Court. These cases pro-
duced no definite guidelines, either as to the tests of insanity applied
or to the act to which such insanity must relate. However, some
comments of the court do afford some limited indication of the
"Fred M. Staudt, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1262 (1953), aff'd per curiam, 216 F.2d
610 (4th Cir. 1954).
"Pasquale Colabella, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 600 (1958).
"1 Estate of Clinton H. Martin, 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 89 (1959), aff'd per curiam,
272 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1959).
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standards applied in those cases. Despite the fact that these com-
ments were probably dicta, they are worth consideration in this
facet of federal tax litigation so generally devoid of authority.
The Tax Court, in Fred M. Staudt,42 had observed as follows:
The petitioner places much reliance on his physical and mental illness
and argues that at the time his original 1942 return was prepared, signed
and filed, he relied on others for its preparation and that he was not
aware that the return was in error. We are not convinced that the
petitioner's illness had developed to such an extent by May 15, 1943, (the
date the return was filed), that the petitioner was unaware of what he
was doing .... (Emphasis added.)
In Estate of Clinton H. Martin,4 3 the court commented as follows:
It is noted that there is no contention that the doctor was non cornpos
mentis in 1951 or did not know right from wrong or was not aware of the
significance of his actions, but merely a contention that his judgment
was impaired. In our opinion this argument is without merit. (Emphasis
added.)
Perhaps the Fred M. Staudt and Estate of Clinton H. Martin cases
indicate that some showing is necessary that the taxpayer does not
know the consequences and significance of his acts and does not have
the ability to distinguish between right and wrong in connection with
his federal income tax returns. It would appear more conservative
and more correct to conclude that no definitive guidelines as to
the nature of the intent involved, or its relationship to civil fraud
has been established in these cases.44
The Emanuel Hollman case however, appears to be more sig-
nificant.
D. The Emanuel Hollman Case
Whether fortuitously or by design, the Tax Court may have
provided some rather significant guidelines on the matter under
4222 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1262, 1265 (1953), aff'd per curiam, 216 F.2d 610 (4th
Cir. 1954).
"128 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 88, 91 (1959), aflfd per curiam, 272 F.2d 191 (2d Cir.
1959).
"While the cases of United States v. Peelle Company, 137 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y.
1956), and United States v. Peelle, 159 F. Supp. 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1958), are significant in
establishing the importance of the use of lay witnesses on the fraud issue, and in estab-
lishing that the condition of incompetence and the year of fraud must coincide, those




consideration in Emanuel Hollman. In view of its possible sig-
nificance, some detailed examination of that case is indicated.
Hollman, in many respects, appears to have presented a rather
good case for the Government on the fraud issue. Briefly reviewed,
the pertinent facts reveal that the taxpayer was well educated, having
attended both college and law school. He was a certified public
accountant and a licensed insurance broker-both of which activities
were actively carried on during the taxable years. He engaged in
many financial transactions of complexity during the taxable years. 4
He showed alertness and astuteness on the witness stand at trial.
Thus, in view of his education and profession and by reason of his
actual employment, he was of the class most likely to have an
awareness of tax matters. There was proof of a substantial and con-
sistent omission or understatement of capital gains, dividends and
interest.46  The amounts omitted exceeded his reported income.
Year Capital Gains Dividends Interest
1951 $4,841.01 $3,197.50 $666.31
1952 1,603.84 4,614.75 652.89
1953 - 4,548.31 650.00
1954 8,963.93 595.40 162.50
1955 8,436.10 4,500.80 -
This pattern, and the relationship of income reported to the total
realized, presented a recognized badge of fraud.47 Furthermore,
when the taxpayer learned that the investigation was in process, he
hastily filed an amended return for one of the taxable years-report-
ing sizeable amounts of previously unreported income. An infer-
ence most certainly could have been drawn from this overt act that
the taxpayer was well aware he had intentionally omitted items from
his return previously filed and in filing the amended return acted
only in fear of being apprehended.
With respect to the taxpayer's defense of insanity, the Tax Court
made the following findings of fact:
Petitioner had during taxable years, and still has severely impaired vision,
caused by keratocotus. His vision without glasses was not better than
20/200 in either eye, and such vision could not be improved by glasses.
15 Similar evidence led the District Court to reject the defense of insanity in Peelle
and Peelle Company, supra note 44, despite the testimony by five psychiatrists in sup-
port of the taxpayer's contentions that he was incompetent.
" Amounts omitted.
17 Schwarzkopf v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 731, 734 (3d Cir. 1957); Baumgardner v.
Commissioner, 251 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1957).
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It could be impro-Ved by a special type of contact lenses to 20/60 in the
right eye and 20/70 in the left eye. With the aid of the contact lenses
he could read and write, and he prepared his income tax returns for
the taxable years. However, he could tolerate the wearing of such lenses
only for brief periods (but not every day) because they produced severe
pain and caused corneal ulcers and infection. Purulent material would
accumulate in such lenses. . . . Petitioner has been abnormally pre-
occupied with his difficulties of vision. He suffered considerable pain in
his eyes, and he was obsessional and delusional with respect to them.
He has been emotionally disturbed and mentally ill for many years, in-
cluding the years in controversy. He was psychotic, and did not have
normal contact with reality; he had paranoid thoughts with regard to his
own family. He had a schizophrenic personality.48
Furthermore, the court found that the taxpayer had been in-
*aicted on charges of wilful evasion of federal income taxes for the
years 1951, 1952, 1954 and 1955, but had not been brought to trial
for the reason that upon psychiatric examination the taxpayer had.
been found to be so mentally incompetent as to be unable to under-
stand the nature of the proceedings against him or to properly assist
counsel in the preparation of his defense; and that upon the Com-
missioner's motion, the Tax Court case was continued pending,
appointment of a special guardian ad litem to prosecute the case
on behalf of the taxpayer.
In this factual situation, the Commissioner, on brief, argued.
that fraud had been shown by the substantial and continued pattern
of understatement of income, by the great disparity between reported
and unreported income, by virtue of petitioner's actions in filing the-
amended return during the investigation, and by virtue of peti-
tioner's education and financial activities.4 9 In essence, the Commis-
sioner argued that the pattern of understatement taken together
with the other matters of record was sufficient to establish a wilful*
intent to evade tax. Moreover, with respect to the taxpayer's defense
of insanity, the Commissioner argued:
The only evidence proffered related to the alleged mental incompe-
tency .... Even ... if it did establish that petitioner was mentally in-
competent during the crucial year it is without significance for, except
insofar as an impairment of mind might deprive the taxpayer of the.
capacity to form the fraudulent intent, petitioner's incompetency or lack
,8.38 T.C. No. 28, at 7.




of it, can have no relationship to the propriety or impropriety of re-
spondent's assertion of the 50 per cent additions to tax for fraud.
It is the respondent's position that petitioner must show by the clear
preponderance of the evidence that each and every time petitioner
prepared and filed his returns for 1951 to 1955, inclusive, he suffered
from a mental disorder which totally deprived him of the capacity to
understand the nature of his actions. 50
In reply to petitioner's argument that there was no evidence that
petitioner had the mental capacity to formulate a fraudulent intent,
the Commissioner stated that the affliction must negate petitioner's
mental capacity to formulate a fraudulent intent, and that peti-
tioner's assertions, relevant to a criminal proceeding, had no applica-
tion to the civil fraud case. The Commissioner argued that the
test of incompetency was a showing of: "The ability to know the
nature, character and effect of one's transactions .... The capacity
to consent to simple contract has been equated with the capacity to
form and entertain the intent necessary for commission of civil
fraud." 5'
In the face of this argument, and the strong factual pattern upon
which the court could easily have found fraud, it did not do so,
purporting to rely upon the Commissioner's failure to carry his
burden of proof. It characterized the Commissioner's argument on
understatement as an argument that understatement of income alone
was sufficient to prove fraud. Conceding that this pattern of under-
statement was strong evidence of fraud, the court held that the
psychiatric testimony cast serious doubt upon the charge of fraud.
In addition, the court pointed to the taxpayer's incapacity to stand
trial in the criminal proceedings, the necessity to continue the Tax
Court case for appointment of a special guardian ad litem, the testi-
mony of the taxpayer's psychiatrists and an independent psychiatrist,
and the severity of the taxpayer's psychosis. The court also weighed
the evidence of the taxpayer's participation in intricate financial
transactions and his astuteness, both of which were inconsistent with
the taxpayer's claim of incompetency. The significant portions of
the opinion with respect to fraud were the court's statements that:
Petitioner's own testimony . . . displayed an astuteness and awareness
of matters that make it difficult to say that his mental condition was
responsible for the understatements of income.... [W]hile we are not
WrL 1963: 428]
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fully satisfied that the false returns were a product of mental disease, the
psychiatric testimony leaves us with such troubling doubts that we
cannot find that fraud has been proved in this case.a2
After opinion, the taxpayer filed a motion for further hearing,
requesting the court to reopen the record for the sole purpose of
showing, by newly discovered evidence, that certain unidentified
bank deposits were not income. At the hearing on petitioner's
motion, the Commissioner moved to reopen the fraud issue, to the
extent that evidence pertinent to this bank deposit bore upon" the
fraud issue. To this limited extent, the fraud issue was reconsidered
by the court. The court, however, upon reconsideration adhered to
its position that there was no fraud, stating as follows:
As to the fraud issue, the Court had some doubts at the conclusion of
the original hearing, but resolved them in petitioner's favor in view of
the burden of proof. These doubts were perhaps somewhat enhanced
by the more recent hearing on the newly discovered' evidence, but con-
sidering the record as a whole, we are still of the opinion that fraud
has not been proved by the requisite clear and convincing evidence.5
While the matter of fraud is essentially factual, in an area in-
volving the relationship of insanity to civil fraud, certain inferences
and implications may be drawn from the court's opinion in Emanuel
Hoilman. These implications relate to the test of insanity applied
and the act to which it must relate.
The definition of civil fraud, cited above, indicates that the
capacity to commit the fraudulent act, with its overtones of malice
and wrongdoing, closely approximates specific criminal intent. The
cases decided in the Tax Court to date involving the defense of
insanity do not clearly indicate whether the specific intent required
is that of mentally harbouring the calculated fraudulent design,
or merely lack of the legal capacity to sign and understand the
federal income tax return. Some clue may be provided by the
opinion of the Tax Court in the Hollman case. There the court
in its opinion stated: "The evidence before us indicated that the
petitioner was suffering from a severe psychosis... and while we are
not fully satisfied that the false returns were a product of mental
disease . ... ."54 Whether the use of the word "product" was calcu-
" 38 T.C. No. 28, at 9.
53Emanuel Hollman, 1962 P-H TAx CT. MEM. DEC. 62,236, at 1402 (1962) (on
reconsideration).
5138 T.C. No. 28, at 9. "/Emphasis added.)
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lated or fortuitous is not clear. If the use of this word were calcu-
lated, such use is most significant, for it possibly indicates an embrace
of the New Hampshire or Durham rule of criminal responsibility
as a test of legal capacity in a civil fraud case. That rule, as ex-
pounded by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in 1871 was that
"the verdict should be not guilty by reason of insanity if the killing
was the offspring or product of the mental disease of the de-
fendant . . . ."5 This rule, frequently referred to as the "product"
rule, has been embraced by the courts of the District of Columbia56
and was expressed in the Durham case as follows: "[Ain accused is
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a
mental disease or mental defect." Whether the "product" rule of
criminal responsibility has been transferred by the Tax Court to
the area of civil fraud is an open question to be resolved by future
litigation. By the court's opinion, however, the implication of a
hybrid test of criminal responsibility is suggested to determine the
capacity of the taxpayer to perpetrate civil tax fraud. Compare
the apparent reference to the "right or wrong test" of M'Naghten's
Case" in Estate of Clinton H. Martin with its possible reference in
Hollman to the "product" test. Whether such a criminal test of
responsibility is pertinent in the civil tax fraud case appears to be
subject to serious question.
Some possible implications of the Emanuel Hollman case may
be summarized as follows:
(1) The court may well have indicated that it applied the "product"
test of criminal responsibility in arriving at the determination that
'5 State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
' See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also
Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fielding v. United States, 251
F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Williams
v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4
(D.C. Cir. 1957). At this juncture, any inquiry as to why the "product" test may have
been considered appropriate by the court may only be answered by sheer speculation
or conjecture. One interesting inquiry would be whether the statutory requirement
that the Tax Court follow the rules of evidence of the District of Columbia, INT.
REV. CoDa op 1954, § 7453, led the court to adopt (if indeed it did) the test of crim-
inal responsibility of the District of Columbia. Quaere whether the substantive law
of the District of Columbia is applicable.
' M'Naghten's Case (1843), 10 Clark and Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722. "[]o
establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was acting under such a defect of
reason from the disease of the mind, as to not know the nature and quality of the act




it was not convinced that the false returns were a product of mental
disease.
(2) Consistent with the Commissioner's argument, the court appears
to require that the mental disease or defect specifically relate to the
execution of the false and fraudulent return, rather than the more
general criminal test of lack of responsibility and inability to formu-
late the specific intent.
(5) This apparently produces a hybrid test: a criminal test of re-
sponsibility applied to a question of civil capacity to perform a
specific act.
(4) The court accepted by implication the condition of schizophrenia
as a condition producing mental incompetency for civil fraud cases.
(5) For the first time, the court apparently attached more weight to
expert psychiatric testimony on incompetency than to substantial
lay evidence of competency.58
Whether these implications will be borne out will require ob-
servation, passage of time, and further litigation. It would be
conservative to say, however, that this decision of the Tax Court
will undoubtedly focus additional attention on the defense of in-
sanity in civil fraud cases.
IV
SOME ADDITIONAL MATTERS OF CONSIDERATION IN CIVIL FRAUD
CASES WHERE INSANITY IS RAISED AS A DEFENSE BY THE TAXPAYER
Briefly, some matters which must be considered when the defense
of insanity is raised in future cases will be: (A) Acquisition of
jurisdiction over the incompetent, and the proper party to bring
suit; (B) Pleading and proof of insanity and presumptions; and
(C) Evidence.
A. Acquisition of Jurisdiction-Proper Parties
Insanity or incompetency of the party who files the petition in
the Tax Court may affect jurisdiction. Therefore, in considering
any statutory notice of deficiency, or in determining the capacity
of the party to bring the Tax Court action, care should be exercised
to see that the statutory notice is addressed to the proper party, and
that the petition is filed by the proper party. The Rules of the
OsSee notes 77 and 78, infra.
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Tax Court provide only that a case in the Tax Court shall be brQught
by and in the name of the person against whom the Commissioner
determined the deficiency or liability, or by and in the full name
of the fiduciary legally entitled to institute a case on behalf of such
person. 9  The general rule, as provided under the Commissioner's
regulation, is that if no notice of fiduciary liability (which includes
that of a guardian) is filed with the District Director, before the
mailing of the statutory notice of deficiency or liability, that a
statutory notice of deficiency or liability mailed to a taxpayer will
be a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Code, even
though the taxpayer is under a legal disability, and that in such
cases, if no petition is filed within the statutory period, the assess-
ment may be made. 0
However, it may be envisioned that in some instances the ques-
tion may arise as to whether the jurisdiction of the Tax Court may
attach over one legally incompetent, especially where no guardian
has been appointed. In cases where one has not been adjudicated
incompetent, the general rule is that jurisdiction may be acquired
in civil proceedings by the same process as over a competent person.
Where there has been an adjudication of incompetency, it is gen-
erally provided that service is to be made upon the committee or
guardian.61 A real problem may be presented in the case of an
adjudication of incompetency, without appointment of a guardian,
in view of the rule in some jurisdictions that a judgment obtained
against an incompetent is void or voidable. 2 This matter is be-
clouded to some extent by the decision of the Tax Court in Sadie
P. Engel.6 3 There, the petition was signed by the petitioner's father.
The son had been in a mental institution for some time prior to the
issuance of the statutory notice, but no legal guardian had been
appointed. The court concluded that it had no jurisdiction that
the son would not be bound by the decision entered therein, and
dismissed the petition. That decision may have rested on alterna-
' TAx CouRT R. PRAc. 6. Compare Rule 4 (d) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that process and summons shall be served upon an in-
competent person in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which service
is made for the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an
action brought in courts of general jurisdiction of that state.
00 Regs. § 301.6903-1 (c).
0129 Am. JuR. Insane Persons § 115 (1960).
02 29 Am. JutR. Insane Persons §§ 117, 124, 127 (1960).
63 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 229 (1958).
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tive grounds, i.e., simply that the father was not authorized to act,
or, that the incompetent without a committee could not authorize
the proceedings.
If such a case were presented, the Commissioner may argue that
under the broad rules provided under section 301.6903-1 (c) 64 of the
Regulations, absent proper notice of fiduciary relationship, a statu-
tory notice mailed to an incompetent would be proper and that
jurisdiction would attach. Whether the Tax Court could possibly
hold that the competency of the party was a matter which went to
its jurisdiction, that the situation was analogous to the power of a
dissolved corporation to sue or be sued, and that this matter of
competency as it relates to jurisdiction was to be determined under
the laws of the appropriate state, is problematical.65
B. Pleading and Proof of Insanity
Insanity in a civil case, as in most criminal cases, is an affirma-
tive defense to be plead and proven by the party relying upon such
defense. 66 Of course, it should not be a defense in the sense that it
excuses fraud; only in that it negates fraudulent intent. In some
jurisdictions, it has been held that the matter of insanity may be
raised by a plea of the general issue.6 7 Under the Rules of Practice
of the Tax Court, the party filing the petition must assign error even
to matters upon which the Commissioner has the burden of proof,
but need not set forth statements of the facts in the petition in re-
spect of allegations of error as to which the burden of proof is upon
the Commissioner. 8 However, under Rule 15, the petitioner's
reply must set forth any facts upon which the petitioner relies for
defense.69 The rule would apparently evolve that the matter must
be specifically pleaded.
In proving fraud, the Commissioner ordinarily may rely upon the
general presumption of sanity, until proof to the contrary is estab-
lished.70 The quality of the proof necessary on the part of the
petitioner is that he must show insanity or incompetency by the
' See note 59, supra.
05 Cf. Wheeler's Peachtree Pharmacy, Inc., 35 T.C. 177 (1960); Sadie P. Engel, 27
P-H Tax C. Mem. 229 (1958).
0629 AM. JuR. Insane Persons §§ 114, 130, 131 (1960).
67 29 AM. JuL- Insane Persons § 131 (1960).
'TAx COURT R. PRAc. 7(c) (ii) (d), (e).
TAx COURT R. PRAc. 15 (b).
70 U.S. v. Cain, 298 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1962).
(Vol. 1963: 428
DEFENSE OF INSANITY
clear preponderance of the evidence.71 If it is concluded that the
petitioner has met this burden and the Commissioner then assumes
the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue of in-
sanity, he may resort to lay witnesses, expert witnesses, and to the
entire record to show sanity such as is necessary to show that the
taxpayer harboured the requisite fraudulent intent.
C. Evidence
While the Government is not required to match the taxpayer
expert for expert,72 positive psychiatric testimony in support of the
Government's or the taxpayer's position and as an aid on cross-
examination will in many cases be essential to presentation of the
parties' cases. One possible source of an expert witness, especially
if there has been a prior criminal case, would be the psychiatrist
who may have been appointed by the district court to determine
the taxpayer's competency to understand the nature of the criminal
case and to assist in his own defense 3 Is there any hindrance to
his testimony at trial? While the statutory authority for such
examination expressly provides that the information obtained by the
psychiatrist is inadmissible in criminal proceedings, nothing what-
soever is said in that statute as to admissibility of the results of
examination in any civil proceeding.7 4 An objection by the tax-
payer to the admissibility of evidence of such prior examination
under the statutory doctor-patient privilege of the District of
Columbia may be expected.7 5 A very significant decision relating to
this point was made in Taylor v. United States,76 where the defendant
was committed to a mental institution by the district court for
special examination as to competency to stand trial. He was found
competent by a staff psychiatrist and tried. On trial of the issue of
insanity at the time of the crime, the testimony of the staff psychia-
trist as to the sanity of the defendant was admitted over an objection
based upon the doctor-patient privilege. The court of appeals re-
71 Cf. Brosnan v. Brosnan, 294 Fed. 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1924); United States v. Peelle
Co., 137 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
72 See note 69, supra.
"3 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958). Criminal proceedings would be instituted under § 7201
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which is the criminal sanction comparable to the
civil fraud penalty provided under § 6653 (b), supra. Of necessity the factual back-
ground of each case would be essentially similar.
74 Ibid.
71 D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (1961).
" 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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versed, holding such testimony inadmissible and concluding that
the statute prohibiting the testimony was to be literally construed
in favor of exclusion and in protection of the patient-psychiatrist
relationship. However, the facts showed that the government
psychiatrist had only examined the witness in connection with daily
rounds and had never been employed as the man's physician or
psychiatrist. While the court of appeals found a professional rela-
tionship to exist and construed the examination to have been treat-
ment, on the presentation of such facts in some future proceeding
an especially strong argument could be made that the relationship
was one only of examination, not of treatment, so that the evidence
obtained would be admissible.77 Under section 14-308 of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code, the privilege relates to disclosures made
during treatment, but not to those made in examination. The Taylor
case was a criminal proceeding, with consequent more stringent
rules of evidence. It is apparent that in a civil matter in the Tax
Court, the .Taylor case may not be considered binding on the
court in an evidentiary sense.
In addition to expert testimony, the testimony of lay witnesses
appears most important. In fact, the importance of lay witnesses to
testify as to the mental condition of the taxpayer can probably not
be too heavily emphasized, in view of the decisions of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in the
Peelle cases.18 There, the court accepted the testimony and opinion
of lay witnesses as to defendant's insanity, and rejected the testimony
of the defendant's five qualified psychiatrists to the effect that the
defendant was incompetent. Also note the importance of the evi-
dence of lay witnesses on the activities of the taxpayer indicating
sanity in the Hollman case, as well as in other cases where the
issue of insanity was raised.79 The testimony of such lay witnesses
and their opinions as to sanity are admissible in the District of
Columbia, and hence in the Tax Court.80 However, prior to estab-
lishing the lay witnesses' opinion as to the taxpayer's sanity, the
lawyer must be careful to lay a predicate showing that the layman
17 Catoe v. United States, 131 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
18 United States v. Peelle, 159 F. Supp. 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Peelle
Co., I37 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
" See notes 32 and 69, supra.
80 Life Ins. Co. v. Merrimon, 35 A.2d 828 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.). See also note 55
supra.
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had a good opportunity to observe the taxpayer, an acquaintance-
ship with the taxpayer, frequent observation, and clearness of
observation. In short, the lay witness must have sufficient facts on
which to base his opinion, and the opinion must relate to the -date
of the event at issue."l Such testimony in a fraud case may usually
be expected through the witnesses whose testimony is pertinent to
prove the fraud items, if the contact of such witnesses with the tax-
payer were sufficiently close to be probative.
In addition to these matters, the competency of the taxpayer's
own testimony may be affected by the plea of insanity. A real
problem demonstrating the care which must be exercised before
pleading the defense of insanity is the importance of the taxpayer's
own testimony in countering or establishing fraud. Some reasons
indicating this importance to the Commissioner are that the taxpayer
is adverse, and that any admissions on the stand may bind the tax-
payer. Of importance to both parties is the fact that he is frequently
the only party competent to identify many of the documents in-
volved, or the only party fully familiar with the pertinent facts.
However, if the taxpayer is mentally incompetent, it does not
appear that his testimony is acceptable in the Tax Court for all
purposes. While at common law an incompetent was not admissible
to be sworn as a witness, the present general rule is that the derange-
ment or defect, in order to disqualify the witness, must be such as
to substantially negative trustworthiness upon the specific subject of
the testimony and that the witness must be able to apprehend the
obligation of an oath.8 2 However, this general rule is apparently
qualified in the District of Columbia, with respect to an incompetent,
to the extent that, in any civil action against a person legally in-
capable of testifying or against his committee, no judgment or decree
shall be rendered in favor of the adverse party founded on the un-
corroborated testimony of an agent, servant, or employee of the
adverse party, as to any transaction, declaration or admission of the
incapable person.1s Whether this provision has applicability to
Tax Court proceedings does not appear to have yet been decided.
U DeBruin v. DeBruin, 90 App. D.C. 236, 195 F.2d 763 (1952); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d
153 (1955).8 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 492 (3d ed. 1940); District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 US.
519 (1882).
8 D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-302 (1961). Whether this provision has literal application
,- ax Court proceedings does not appear to have been decided in a reported decision.
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As a matter of limited relief from the foregoing provision, the
District of Columbia Code also provides that the prior testimony of
an insane person given at a time when he was competent to testify
may be given in evidence in any trial in relation to the same subject
matter; and that in such case, the adverse party may testify in
opposition thereto.84  This latter provision appears especially im-
portant in a civil fraud case, as there may well have been a prior
criminal trial at a time when the taxpayer was competent. More-
over, another possibility of using the incompetent's testimony would
be to establish that it was given by the taxpayer, even if incompetent,
during a lucid interval, as testimony during such lucid interval is
competent testimony. The party seeking admission, however, has
the burden of proof to establish existence of the lucid interval.85
Thus, as the taxpayer's testimony is usually important to both parties,
real care must be observed to see that the plea of insanity does not
render his testimony incompetent.
V
CONCLUSION
Emanuel Hoilman apparently contains several important implica-
tions which must be considered in prosecuting any civil fraud case
where the defense of insanity is raised. These implications, discussed
in detaii above, afford some indication of a test of insanity in a civil
fraud case, the act to which it must relate, and a form of medical
insanity recognized by the Tax Court as having legal significance
in tax matters. These implications, however, are probably only
temporary. The real significance of the case, is that it focuses
attention on this very unusual defense in a civil fraud case, thus
presenting a relatively new set of problems to be resolved by the
court.
81D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-303 (1961).
85 1 Bouv. LAw Diar. 2057 (1914).
[Vol. 1963: 428
